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Domain 12

Crime and Policing

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Enforcement is an inspection game; deterrence depends on detection probability far more than on penalty severity.

The comparative static is the useful part. Because each side mixes to make the other indifferent, raising the penalty reduces the equilibrium inspection rate rather than the violation rate — unless the inspection rate is held fixed from outside the game. Which means increasing sentences without increasing detection is predicted to change very little, and the empirical literature broadly agrees. Plea bargaining is an ultimatum with an enormous asymmetry in the cost of refusal, which is why guilty pleas do not straightforwardly indicate guilt.

A dark street at night receding between buildings, one car at the far end under a light, and a large figure in silhouette in the foreground.
The player this field leaves off the list

Victims, who are frequently not parties to the prosecution at all. Also the communities where enforcement is concentrated, whose willingness to cooperate is a shared resource that heavy-handed enforcement depletes.

What to look for


  • Is coverage predictable? Then it is being routed around.
  • Is the policy raising the penalty or raising the chance of being caught?
  • What does refusing the offer cost the defendant, versus accepting it?
  • Is community cooperation being spent faster than it is being replaced?

The shapes that run this field


In practice


The Inspection Game

Patrols on a fixed schedule, and offending that has simply moved to the gaps.

The Ultimatum

A plea offer where refusal risks many times the sentence. It is rational to accept whether or not you did it.

The Commons

Enforcement that raises short-term compliance and spends the cooperation it will need next year.