Skip to content
The Game Theory of Everythingsee the game you are already in
Reading level
The words people actually use at work and in the news.

Domain 10

War and Security

← All domains

The security dilemma: measures taken for safety are indistinguishable from measures taken for aggression.

Deterrence is a credibility problem before it is a capability problem: a threat only works if carrying it out would be rational at the moment it would have to be carried out, which is why so much of security policy is about removing one's own discretion. Crisis bargaining is chicken with the largest possible audience and the strongest possible commitment incentives, which is exactly the dangerous combination. And verification is the whole substance of arms control — not because trust is absent, but because unverifiable agreements are not commitments at all.

A long border fence crossing empty ground, with a watchtower at each end.
The player this field leaves off the list

Civilians, who bear most of the cost of every outcome and are players in none of the decisions. Also the domestic audience on each side, whose reaction to a concession is frequently the binding constraint on the leadership.

What to look for

  • Can the other side tell your defensive step from an offensive one?
  • Would the threat actually be rational to carry out at the moment it arrives?
  • Who is the concession audience — and can either leader survive backing down?
  • Is the agreement verifiable? An unverifiable promise is not a commitment.

The shapes that run this field

Shape 16

Escalation

A sequence in which each response justifies the next, and no step is individually unreasonable.

Shape 02

Chicken

Two equilibria, both lopsided: one side concedes and the other does not. No dominant move.

Shape 11

Commitment

Removing your own option raises your payoff, because it changes what the other side's best response is.

Shape 17

The Inspection Game

A strictly competitive game with no pure equilibrium: the inspector wants to match, the evader wants to miss.

Shape 01

The Prisoner's Dilemma

Mutual cooperation beats mutual defection, but defecting is the better move whatever the other side does.

In practice

Escalation

Both sides increasing capability for defence, each increase justifying the other's.

Chicken

A crisis where both leaderships have committed publicly and neither can now move.

The Inspection Game

Weapons inspections: coverage is partial and both sides are mixing.

Train on war and security →
← School and EducationPlatforms and AI →